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The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents the largest infrastructure and development project 45 
in human history, and presents risks and opportunities for ecosystems, economies, and 46 
communities. Some risks, (habitat fragmentation, roadkill), are obvious, however many of the 47 
BRI’s largest challenges for development and conservation are not obvious and require extensive 48 
consideration to identify. In this first BRI Horizon Scan, we identify eleven frontier issues that 49 
may have large environmental and social impacts but are not yet recognised. More generally, the 50 
BRI will increase China’s participation in international environmental governance. Thus, new 51 
cooperative modes of governance are needed to balance geopolitical, societal, and environmental 52 
interests. Upgrading and standardising global environmental standards is essential to safeguard 53 
ecological systems and human societies.  54 
 55 
Challenges of the Belt & Road initiative  56 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the largest and most ambitious global infrastructure 57 
initiative ever planned. Spanning 65 countries in its initial phase (with global expansion 58 
progressing) and with five components (policy coordination, transport connectivity, trade 59 
facilitation, currency convertibility, and people-to-people exchanges; Box 1), the BRI presents a 60 
suite of both well-known and novel challenges and opportunities to natural and social systems. 61 
To date, most research has focused on the potential impacts of the transport-connectivity 62 
component, which involves the building of roads, railways, and pipelines (the ‘Belt’), seaports 63 
along maritime-shipping routes (the ‘Road’), and special economic zones along these new 64 
transport links, and which can be subdivided into direct impacts (in the vicinity of construction, 65 
i.e. habitat loss and fragmentation, roadkill, and disruption of migratory routes [1]; [2]), indirect 66 
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impacts (e.g. supportive infrastructure, pollution), and displaced impacts (e.g. raw material 67 
extraction, climate change). However, a more holistic approach is needed to identify less obvious 68 
but potentially equally important impacts of a project of this scale and complexity; and few prior 69 
studies have included the interdisciplinary teams needed to assay the consequences of the 70 
intersection of social, economic, and environmental issues, and how associated risk may be 71 
appropriately managed (see Outstanding questions).  72 
Some media reports have taken alarmist perspectives on the potential risks posed by the BRI 73 
([3,4]), while other sources highlight its potential to act as a catalyst for green infrastructure 74 
development while enhancing human welfare and environmental health. Either way, careful and 75 
well-reasoned analysis and debate are needed to generate solutions to potential problems, to 76 
avoid or mitigate negative impacts, and to maximise emerging opportunities. Here, we look to 77 
the future to identify “frontier horizon issues” that may have large impacts within a few years but 78 
are not yet generally known to policymakers or academics, and provide suggestions of solutions 79 
and approaches to mitigate them.  80 
 81 
Frontier Issues Identification  82 
An interdisciplinary group of researchers was assembled to identify ‘frontier horizon’ 83 
environmental and social issues for the BRI using a modified Delphi method (Supplemental 84 
Methods). One hundred issues were initially submitted, then revised to 63 issues for voting. 85 
After voting, 33 issues (19 environmental and 14 social) were retained for in-depth discussion 86 
and on-site voting (Supplement 2). Of these, eleven issues were retained, being considered likely 87 
to have major impacts within the next few years but not yet well-known to policymakers or 88 
academics. These final-list issues are approximately half social and half environmental, though 89 
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most have implications for both. The top eleven issues were scored similarly by (self-identified) 90 
natural and social scientists, whereas lower ranked issues were more variable. Seven other issues 91 
were deemed high impact but insufficiently novel, with the natural scientists generally giving 92 
these six lower scores (Supplements 1). Two examples are (1) the prospect of ‘Cryptic PADDD’ 93 
(Protected-Area Downgrading, Downsizing, and Degazettement) driven by BRI routes fracturing 94 
existing reserves or displacing people into protected areas and (2) the loss of distinct native crop 95 
and livestock breeds/varieties, due to market pressures under globalising systems that 96 
homogenise food systems. The eleven final-list issues are presented below in descending order of 97 
their combined scores. 98 
 99 
Frontier issues 100 
 101 
1. Groundwater pumping threatening the viability of freshwater ecosystems 102 
Rapid decline of natural river ecosystems was recognised as one of the most acute problems 103 
related to the BRI, as changing power and irrigation demands means damming of free-flowing 104 
rivers across many BRI regions. Yet surface-freshwater ecosystems (lakes, wetlands, rivers, and 105 
streams) are vulnerable not only to direct damming, but also to loss of ‘baseflow supply’ from 106 
groundwater reservoirs. Baseflow supply is essential to maintain continuity of water flow 107 
through dry periods and to supply the cool, clean, oxygenated water that is required for the 108 
survival of aquatic food webs during warm summer months [5]. Long before groundwater 109 
storage levels have been substantially depleted, pumping can reduce groundwater baseflows into 110 
surface waters by enough to threaten the viability of aquatic ecosystems [6]. High-resolution 111 
modelling now suggests that by 2050, under a business-as-usual groundwater-pumping scenario, 112 
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aquatic ecosystem viability will have been or will begin to be threatened in 42-79% of 113 
watersheds around the world [6]. Because many of these threatened aquatic ecosystems are in 114 
regions traversed by the BRI, such as Central Asia (Figure 1a), groundwater pumping rates will 115 
likely rise due to demand for infrastructure (e.g. concrete), mining, and agriculture. Severe 116 
groundwater depletion can also cause water flows to reverse from surface to underground, 117 
resulting in contamination by metals, nutrients, and pesticides into groundwater reserves, 118 
potentially restricting future groundwater use and harming little-known subterranean biodiversity 119 
[7]. Identifying areas most at risk (i.e. see Fig 1) and avoiding development already at risk of 120 
groundwater depletion is a simple step to minimise the probability groundwater depletion, whilst 121 
more holistic assessments of alternative sources of power provision may provide less 122 
environmentally harmful outcomes for ecosystems and societies along the route. 123 
 124 
2. Invisible invasives: incidental spread of fungi, bacteria, and viruses  125 
Though the risk of invasive plant and animal species along new transport routes is well-126 
acknowledged, the risk posed by smaller invaders is frequently overlooked [8]. Microorganisms 127 
are omnipresent and important for ecosystem services such as decomposition, and the vast 128 
majority are unknown, with <1% of expected species described for bacteria and fungi [9]. For 129 
example, a study in Thailand found that 96% of inventoried fungi were undescribed, with their 130 
invasive potentials unknown along the core BRI route [10]. Although few microbial species are 131 
directly pathogenic on humans, they are important [11], and plant-pathogenic microbes may 132 
endanger food security across highly-populated developing countries across the BRI [9]. 133 
Increased traffic of people and livestock along BRI routes also provide a risk of spread of 134 
diseases. Epidemics in amphibians [12], bats [13], and Saiga antelope [14] originated in Eurasia 135 
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and demonstrate the potential impact of disease on species and populations. Local microbial 136 
communities might also be exposed to competitive displacement, with unknown effects on soil 137 
functioning and the possibility of increased pathogenicity, since greater prevalence raises the 138 
probability of resistance development [15]. With enhanced connectivity among regions 139 
facilitated by BRI, biosecurity screenings and more stringent waste-disposal standards will 140 
become progressively more vital to prevent the potential of the spread of disease to naïve 141 
populations. 142 
 143 
3. Cementing extinction  144 
Sand-mining is a known biodiversity threat [16], but the impact cement production on limestone 145 
ecosystems is often overlooked. About 20% of terrestrial ecosystems are limestone-based karsts 146 
[17]; in Southeast Asia, this equates to ~800,000km2. A single karst formation can host over 147 
twelve known site-endemic species, and it is estimated that 90% of karst-cave invertebrate 148 
species are still undescribed [18]. In Southeast Asia, these ecosystems lose about 6% of their 149 
area annually, largely for cement extraction. As a reference measure of cement demand, China 150 
itself accounts for around 63% of annual global cement consumption, at an equivalent of around 151 
1.7 tonnes for each of its 1.34 billion people [19]. Many regions across the BRI preferentially use 152 
cement in road construction, given lower costs and higher durability, which will likely cause a 153 
significant increase in the mining of karsts for limestone [1]. Consequently, these irreplaceable 154 
karst ecosystems may be some of the most threatened by BRI, despite many being distant from 155 
BRI routes, and careful sourcing policies (or the use of alternatives to traditional cement such as 156 




4. Polar/Arctic Silk Road 159 
The thawing Arctic icecap is enabling marine traffic and increasing extraction pressures for 160 
natural gas, oil, fish, and minerals, creating the so-called ‘Polar/Arctic Silk Road’. In 2017, 161 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) icebreaking tankers with cargo capacities of 172,600 m³ started 162 
operation [20], and over 20 million tons of LNG have already been shipped from Russia’s Yamal 163 
LNG plant. The infrastructure for LNG plants has disrupted ecosystems [21] and impacted 164 
indigenous communities [22]. Increasing traffic in new shipping lanes risks marine-mammal 165 
collisions and the pollution of their habitats [23], and the reduction of Arctic sea-ice is already 166 
implicated in the transfer of phocine distemper virus from Atlantic to Pacific marine mammals 167 
[24]. Melting ice and permafrost also release diseases frozen for thousands of years, and 168 
measures need to be taken to ensure the preservation of new long frozen specimens, their 169 
screening for potential infections, and to monitor the release of mercury [25]. The precautionary 170 
approach has been widely endorsed [26] but cannot survive this acceleration into ‘new 171 
passageways and new trade opportunities’ [27]. Hence there is a need for an overarching legal 172 
treaty to provide environmental governance in the Arctic, both to maintain terrestrial and aquatic 173 
habitats and to provide adequate biosecurity measures.  174 
 175 
5. Coastal ecosystems under threat  176 
Coastal ecosystems tend to fall through the gap when considering terrestrial or marine systems, 177 
yet they are under huge threat as the interface between the maritime and terrestrial components, 178 
subject to increased shipping, new port development, and reclamation as well as pollution. The 179 
EAAF (East Asian–Australasian Flyway, a bird migratory route) spans much of East and 180 
Southeast Asia’s coastlines, but coastal reclamation and pollution, especially key breeding 181 
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grounds around the Yellow Sea, have already driven the loss of over 70% of some species 182 
populations for the estimated 50 million migratory birds that annually use this route [28]. The 183 
development of ports and reclamation of further coastlines for the maritime component of the 184 
BRI could prove disastrous for these species [29], especially given that around the Yellow Sea, 185 
61% of priority bird sites are unprotected and tidal flats have decreased in area by 65% since the 186 
1950s. Protected-area shrinkage has also been highest in coastal systems at 55% loss, relative to 187 
3% average for China [30], reflecting the rapid loss and under-protection of coastal systems. 188 
Construction of industrial, agricultural, and aquaculture parks as well as new ports is impacting 189 
the coastline via sedimentation, destruction of biota, and pollution [31]. New guidelines for the 190 
sustainable management of these systems, and the identification and preservation of key sites are 191 
urgently needed to provide adequate protection for coast-dependent species. 192 
 193 
6. BRI and Traditional Chinese Medicine supporting and stimulating a market in 194 
wildlife trade 195 
Promotion of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) is a central component of BRI “people-to-196 
people exchange” goals. Formal agreements have been signed between China and BRI countries 197 
on cooperation related to traditional medicine [32], and TCM training centres are being 198 
established along BRI routes [33]. Active TCM promotion, coupled with its inclusion in the 199 
World Health Organization’s 2019 International Classification of Disease [34], will likely 200 
increase demand, use, and access to TCM products globally. Chinese overseas workers on BRI 201 
infrastructure projects might increase demand for threatened wildlife locally, and/or export 202 
wildlife products back to China. In addition, the BRI’s increased connectivity and access to 203 
previously unreachable wild places that could facilitate the sourcing from new areas of wildlife-204 
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based TCM ingredients, along with species for pets, ornamentation, and food [35], all of which 205 
increase the risk of new arising zoonotic diseases and/or the transmission of those diseases along 206 
the BRI. Existing international and national legal mechanisms are insufficient to prevent illegal 207 
trade in endangered species between China and the countries involved in the BRI [36]. However, 208 
if measures are put in place to develop sustainable supply chains, new markets for some TCM 209 
products could also support sustainable development and rural livelihoods [37], potentially 210 
supported by China’s newly announced supply-chain tracking system to ensure ingredient 211 
quality and safety (http://www.china.org.cn/china/2019-11/21/content_75431126.htm). 212 
 213
7. Harmonizing international and national environmental standards in BRI foreign 214 
investment projects  215 
Mismatches frequently exist between international and domestic legal, environmental, and social 216 
standards (i.e. requirements of environmental or social impact assessments, and monitoring as 217 
conditions of financing). This creates challenges in the setting of locally appropriate standards 218 
and in the forms of investment that should be funded by BRI, even before considering 219 
enforcement. The lowering of trade barriers could mean that jurisdictions with laxer 220 
environmental regulations become attractive to polluting industries [38], or that competition for 221 
reducing costs forces down international standards. High-level policy on BRI (i.e. Greening the 222 
BRI [39]) as well as policies and regulations within China (i.e. ‘Ecological Civilization’) 223 
advocate for environmental and social protection, and green development. However, how these 224 
policies translate on the ground remains unclear, particularly beyond China’s borders. Little 225 
alignment in standards and safeguards from the International Finance Corporations, development 226 
banks and Equator Principles institutions with Chinese financial institutions has occurred to date. 227 
However, China's multilateral investment bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [40], 228 
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has adopted environmental and social safeguards resembling those of other development banks 229 
and committed to review them every three years [41]. There is also the argument that engaging 230 
with multiple stakeholders can help ‘scrutinise contracts, flag bad deals, and empower countries 231 
to push for better terms,’ as shown in the case of Myanmar, where a US task force facilitated 232 
renegotiation of the Kyaukphyu special economic zone development to protect human rights of 233 
people in the region (https://ejatlas.org/conflict/kyaukpyu-special-economic-zone). International 234 
actors are also pushing for the development of a project bank to improve screening and 235 
transparency mechanisms for investment projects [42], suggesting that with the right impetus, the 236 
BRI could propel a global rise in environmental and social standards. 237 
 238 
8. Securing the inclusive governance and management of ‘Territories of Life’ and 239 
recognising the role of ‘culture’ in conservation of biodiversity by indigenous and local 240 
communities  241 
Over a quarter of the world’s land across 87 countries falls under local collective governance, 242 
overlapping 40% of terrestrial protected areas and numerous key biodiversity areas (KBAs) [43] 243 
(Figure 1b). It is unlikely that any of the global goals of increasing protected area coverage and 244 
management effectiveness can be achieved without including these “Territories of Life” 245 
(territories/areas conserved by indigenous peoples and local communities) and their custodians 246 
[44]. BRI projects transect numerous such territories, but the potential social and environmental 247 
impacts are unquantified, and laws often provide insufficient protection (Figure 1b). Custodian 248 
communities should be included throughout all stages of planning and implementation to ensure 249 
cultural continuity and sharing of benefits, to enable wellbeing [45] and sustainable livelihoods, 250 
particularly in pastoral communities [46]. Multifaceted values of territories and biodiversity 251 
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require careful consideration, and the roles of culture and inclusive conservation within 252 
sustainable development need recognition and inclusion [47]. BRI projects need action plans that 253 
protect the rights of indigenous and local communities and ensure their full participation in 254 
environmental management and other development dialogues relevant to those projects. 255 
Common values regarding all socio-ecological systems affected by BRI need identification and 256 
inclusion [48] to enable more pluralistic societies to develop and prosper together. 257 
 258 
9. The environmental consequences of geopolitical rivalry over infrastructure 259 
financing  260 
In response to the BRI, other G20 countries have proposed global and regional development 261 
initiatives, such as the EU Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia [49], the U.S. International 262 
Development Finance Corporation, and the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the 263 
Pacific [50], which could accelerate investment in large physical infrastructure, potentially 264 
entailing less-thorough analysis of alternative, sustainable development options. Such 265 
geopolitical rivalry at the international level, combined with commercial competition for specific 266 
projects, could in turn decrease the appetite of sponsors and financiers for confronting 267 
corruption, scrutinising governance weaknesses, and addressing environmental and social risks 268 
in host countries [51]. Competition with BRI projects might exacerbate debt-fed, large-scale, 269 
top-down megaproject developments and perpetuate low-quality strategic development planning. 270 
For example, in 2019, the US, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan announced a commitment to 271 
connect 70% of Papua New Guinea’s population to a nationwide electrical grid, which was 272 
reported as an explicit counterbalance to China-financed infrastructure projects in PNG [52]. 273 
Such competition could have consequences for the environment, as standards may be 274 
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compromised to compete, especially in time-limited projects. This project has been criticised for 275 
its failure to take advantage of greener and cheaper local-power-generation options. Another 276 
example of such rivalry is the funding of river damming projects by the World-Bank, which 277 
stopped in 1997 following the World-Commission on Dams report on the impact of large dam 278 
projects. But this decision was reversed twenty years later due to funding by China and Brazil, 279 
despite their well-recognised ecological consequences [53].  280 
Alternatively, ‘counter-BRI’ initiatives could raise standards for more inclusive, environmentally 281 
sustainable, and locally-driven development (i.e. the World Bank’s Environmental and Social 282 
Framework, Japan and the ADB’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure) [54], given that some of 283 
these new initiatives emphasise sustainability and high quality. 284 
 285 
10. Regreening the never green: “Anti-desertification” and “restoration” in natural 286 
ecosystems  287 
Across Central-Asia along the route of the BRI, there are efforts to counter desertification 288 
through large-scale planting of drought-resistant and deep-rooted species. However, some of 289 
these efforts aim to convert native deserts and savannas into more economically productive 290 
systems. For example the conversion of a third of the Kubuqi desert (Inner Mongolia) to 291 
productive landscapes, with plans for expansion across Central Asia. The Chinese company 292 
ELION claims that biodiversity has increased in their projects (http://www.elion.com.cn/en/), but 293 
third-party supporting evidence or standardised inventory data do not seem to exist, which raises 294 
potential risks of reduced ecosystem functioning and invasion by alien animal and plant species. 295 
For instance, tree-planting campaigns have been used to combat erosion and climate change in 296 
other native ecosystems (e.g. savannas [55]), but when composed of non-native species, they 297 
13 
 
have reduced native biodiversity [56] and lowered the water-table [57] and actively damaged 298 
native biodiversity. Yet, these schemes are still championed to “combat climate change” despite 299 
often being less effective than native functional ecosystems and at huge potential cost to 300 
biodiversity, as has been demonstrated with the AFR100 scheme, which aims to afforest native 301 
grassy-biomes across Africa ([58]). These “regreening initiatives” are being actively explored by 302 
arid countries along the route of the BRI (Kubuqi Forum 2019: http://en.kubuqiforum.org/). A 303 
BRI-facilitated drive for afforestation as climate-change mitigation and anti-desertification 304 
measure based on monocultures and/or on non-native and water-thirsty species could reduce 305 
native biodiversity, by changing the dynamics of natural systems, especially if conducted with no 306 
inventory of native diversity. To minimise ecological risk better methods for inventorying native 307 
diversity are needed, in addition to policies that target systems which requiring restoration or 308 
rewilding, rather than modifying viable native ecosystems for commercial gain.  309 
 310 
11. Willingness to build infrastructure in existing conflict zones  311 
At the international level, policy frameworks and codes of conduct for undertaking large-scale 312 
infrastructure projects in conflict zones do not exist, and the standard response to conflict has 313 
been to restrict investment. Such ‘frozen conflicts’ can break connectivity and drive up 314 
inefficiencies, cause large diversion routes to bypass conflict zones, as exemplified by the 315 
closure of borders to Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey, which in turn has resulted in billions of 316 
dollars of compensatory road building to facilitate trade between Azerbaijan and Europe [59]. In 317 
the West, infrastructure building in conflict zones has been thought only to provide a barometer 318 
of the likelihood of transition out of conflict [60]. In contrast, since the conflict in Darfur, Sudan 319 
in 2007, China has advocated economic development as a driver of peace and a primary means 320 
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of post-conflict reconstruction [61]. However, on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 321 
(including Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), the construction of roads and rails to link Xinjiang in 322 
China with the Indian Ocean has required a large security force to ensure the safety of BRI 323 
projects [62]. The Kyaukpyu-Kunming railway and three new Special Economic Zones in 324 
Myanmar intersect with conflict zones that are currently occupied by independent army groups 325 
(Figure 1c). The diversion of resources for security reduces the scope for carrying out 326 
environmental and social impact assessments and addressing other critical issues such as water 327 
conservation, wildlife trafficking, and the modification of infrastructure to avoid environmentally 328 
and socially sensitive areas. Infrastructure projects in such regions could also exacerbate existing 329 
social tensions and environmental challenges. Navigating such challenges is difficult, and may 330 
require the development of additional funding programs in areas where the cost of security 331 
reduce the budget available for carrying out standardised environmental assessment. 332 
 333 
Discussion 334 
Many of the 100 issues in our initial list were considered high impact but not novel and thus 335 
were not included in the final list of 11 frontier issues (Supplements 2). However, to our 336 
knowledge, no holistic interdisciplinary evaluation of even the non-novel impacts exists for any 337 
given geographic region. Though ecological analyses have been conducted [1,51] analysing 338 
environmental impacts is challenging due to the lack of biodiversity data for many BRI regions, 339 
and have largely ignored more complex topics or the interactions between environmental and 340 
social issues. 341 
 342 
The role of China in shaping global environmental governance.  343 
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China’s BRI presents both risks and opportunities for economies, ecosystems, and human 344 
societies. In the current geopolitical climate, we are witnessing a build-up of competition that 345 
threatens to undermine international cooperation. As the centre of global power shifts, 346 
conflicting strategic and economic concerns between China and other parts of the world will only 347 
become more pronounced. New modalities of global governance thus must seek to reconcile 348 
diverging national interests while mitigating friction between different groups of stakeholders, in 349 
the pursuit of improved environmental and social standards. Above all, to ensure long-term 350 
sustainability, social and environmental impact assessments need to be fully integrated into BRI-351 
mandated projects. In many of these issues, there is a clear trade-off between development and 352 
sustainability, and though some issues may be effectively managed through financial policies, 353 
which require EIA with oversight, and may only require bilateral or even just donor based policy 354 
consideration, others such as provisions to protect against fallout from geopolitical rivalry, may 355 
require more global agreements, such as international conventions. Issues such as access to water 356 
are likely to become more pronounced; thus equitable modes of Governance need to be 357 
developed to ensure with water access is not impacted by demand from other countries. 358 
In addition some issues highlight the importance of the inclusion of diverse voices, and the 359 
development of processes that ensure their role from planning to development. There is also the 360 
need to develop safeguards to protect cultural diversity and local varieties in formerly isolated 361 
areas. 362 
Looking to the future 363 
Many of the issues that we identified in our Horizon Scan, especially issues 6 (TCM supply-364 
chain tracking), 7 (harmonization of environmental standards), 9 (geopolitical rivalry) and 11 365 
(building in conflict zones) suggest that China will need to increase its participation in the 366 
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structures of global environmental governance. Domestically, China has recently instituted a 367 
high-level policy of achieving an ‘Ecological Civilization’, which includes as one of its measures 368 
the definition and protection of ‘ecological redlines,’ which are the minimal areas needed to 369 
guarantee ecological functioning and biological diversity [63]. This is arguably the largest 370 
ecosystem-service-protection policy in the world, and its implementation, assessment, and 371 
enforcement are posing large challenges to China’s scientists and policymakers [64]. Important 372 
questions to ask are whether China will apply the ecological redline concept to the BRI, and if 373 
so, how the governance of such an approach can be instituted in a more complex international 374 
environment (see Outstanding Questions). 375 
Alternatively, the build-up of economic competition within the international system may fuel a 376 
race to the bottom. Thus, new cooperative modes of governance are needed to balance a wide 377 
range of geopolitical, societal, and environmental interests. Upgrading global environmental 378 
standards is a prerequisite for ensuring a more sustainable and equitable BRI that can play a role 379 
in safeguarding the future of ecological systems and human societies.  380 
 381 
 382 
Box 1. What is the Belt and Road Initiative? 383 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI; One Belt One Road (一带一路), Silk Road Economic Belt 384 
and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road) was officially launched in 2013 by China’s President 385 
Xi Jinping as the modern version of the historical Silk Road, which had for centuries facilitated 386 
trade and cultural exchange across Eurasia. The BRI is primarily intended to increase trade and 387 
connectivity amongst China, Central and South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa [65], 388 
though global expansion is underway. This will be achieved by advancing BRI’s five main 389 
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components: policy coordination, transport connectivity, trade facilitation (i.e. more efficient 390 
border crossings), currency convertibility, and people-to-people exchanges.  391 
The BRI’s initial geographic coverage encompassed 65 countries (including China) across 392 
mainland Eurasia, Africa, and the Middle East, although the BRI ‘brand’ has since been applied 393 
to many other China-financed projects globally. Consequently, it is difficult to delimit the 394 
amount of China-sourced finance that will be spent on the BRI, but one estimate is >US$100 395 
billion/yr 2017-2027 [66]. To put this in perspective, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 396 
Development estimates the 2018-2022 infrastructure spending needs of the 36 countries in its 397 
remit (largely overlapping with the BRI) as >US$320 billion/yr, with two-thirds needed for 398 
transport connectivity [59]. While there is talk of integration between the BRI and other regional 399 
infrastructural plans, concrete actions are incipient (ASEAN-China Joint Statement on 400 
Synergising the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025).  401 
To fulfil the strategic visions of the BRI, numerous projects aim to generate new high-resolution 402 
data and improve the capacity to plan and understand the impacts of the route. For example, the 403 
“Digital Silk Road” (DBAR) has been developed with an initial budget equivalent to US$32 404 
million [67]. DBAR aims to provide high-quality remotely sensed data to overcome present data 405 
deficits (the “digital divide”) to apply remotely sensed data as a tool for global targets and 406 
challenges such as the SDGs and to better inform sustainable development across BRI partner 407 
countries [68]. DBAR also aims enable scientific cooperation across BRI regions, thus an 408 
Alliance of International Science Organisations of the BRI region has been established, including 409 
over 120 nations, in addition to regional alliances [69]. 410 
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The cultural component of BRI should not be overlooked and has already included over 10,000 411 
scholarships, >240% increase in tourist visits, and 374 training facilities for cultural activities 412 
(such as TCM) in BRI countries 413 
(https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d674d7841544d34457a6333566d54/index.html).  414 
Understanding the BRI and associated impacts and opportunities requires consideration of all 415 
components of the BRI vision, including not only hard infrastructure, but also social, 416 
environmental, economic, and technological change. Most studies have focused on the impact of 417 
hard-infrastructure to the ecosystems traversed by the BRI [1], which though significant are only 418 
a part of the environmental and ecological implications of the initiative. As highlighted above 419 
BRI has the scope to have global impacts that are less obvious but simultaneously provide 420 
opportunities for new forms of governance. 421 
 422 
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